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IMMIGRATION IN SPAIN: MIGRATORY ROUTES, COOPERATION 
WITH THIRD COUNTRIES AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN RETURN 
PROCEDURES
Inmaculada GONZÁLEZ GARCÍA1
I.- INTRODUCTION. II.- SEA AND LAND IMMIGRATION ROUTES TO 
SPAIN: COOPERATION WITH THIRD COUNTRIES TO FIGHT IRREGULAR 
IMMIGRATION. III.- ENTRY TO SPAIN VIA CEUTA, MELILLA AND SPANISH 
ISLANDS AND ISLETS IN NORTH AFRICA: THE 1992 SPANISH-MOROCCAN 
AGREEMENT ON READMISSION OF FOREIGNERS WHO HAVE ENTERED 
IRREGULARLY. IV.- FINAL ASSESSMENT
ABSTRACT: Following a brief overview of immigration in Spain, the present paper first analyses the 
main routes of irregular immigration into Spain, giving recent data on the number of arrivals by sea and 
land to the Iberian Peninsula, Balearic Islands, Canary Islands and Spanish territories in North Africa. 
The sea has traditionally been the main route of entry to Spanish territory for immigrants primarily from 
Sub-Saharan Africa. However, the years 2013 to 2015 proved an exception to this rule, with immigration 
by land outstripping that by sea due to an increase in the arrival of Syrian immigrants to the cities of 
Ceuta and above all Melilla. Next, a description is given of the political and operational mechanisms es-
tablished by the Spanish authorities to control Spain’s maritime borders, especially in the Canary Islands. 
Such border control is achieved through unilateral surveillance measures (the Integrated External Sur-
veillance System, Spanish initials: SIVE), bilateral cooperation (inter-state agreements with Morocco 
and other countries in Sub-Saharan Africa) and regional cooperation within the European Union (EU). 
This is followed by a discussion of how immigration routes have been affected by increased cooperation 
between Spain and African States to intercept immigrants in their countries of origin or during transit. 
There is likewise an analysis of Spain’s use of summary returns or pushbacks following assaults or 
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jumps on the border fences surrounding Ceuta and Melilla and attempts of arrival by swimming in Ceuta 
or by sea to Spanish islands and islets in North Africa, within the framework of the 1992 Spanish-Mo-
roccan agreement on readmission of foreigners who have entered irregularly. Lastly, we argue that the 
reinforcement of border control alone is insufficient to curb migration flows: to be effective, it must be 
accompanied by common policies in the European countries of destination and increased investment in 
the countries of origin to provide their citizens with the opportunity to obtain a higher standard of living 
and overcome the temptation to emigrate as a first option.
KEYWORDS: Immigration, Spain, West African route, Western Mediterranean route, Ceuta, 
Melilla, border, border control, Spanish-Moroccan agreement on readmission, Morocco, Human 
Rights.
LA INMIGRACIÓN EN ESPAÑA: RUTAS MIGRATORIAS, COOPERACIÓN CON 
TERCEROS PAÍSES Y DERECHOS HUMANOS EN LOS PROCEDIMIENTOS DE 
DEVOLUCIÓN
RESUMEN: Tras una breve presentación de la inmigración en España, se analizan las principales 
vías de entrada a España para la inmigración irregular, con datos recientes del número de  llegadas 
por vía marítima y terrestre al territorio peninsular y balear, al archipiélago canario y  a los territo-
rios españoles en el norte de África. Las rutas marítimas se consolidan como la tradicional forma de 
acceso al territorio español para los inmigrantes procedentes, principalmente, del África Subsaha-
riana. Una excepción se dio en los años 2013 a 2015, en los que la inmigración por vía terrestre fue 
superior a la marítima, debido al incremento de la llegada de inmigrantes sirios a las Ciudades de 
Ceuta y, principalmente, de Melilla. En particular, el análisis se centra en los mecanismos políticos 
y operativos establecidos por las autoridades españolas para mantener el control de sus fronteras 
marítimas, especialmente en las Islas Canarias. Estas fronteras marítimas se controlan mediante 
medidas unilaterales de vigilancia (Sistema Integrado de Vigilancia Exterior –SIVE-), cooperación 
bilateral (acuerdos interestatales con Marruecos y otros países del África subsahariana) y coopera-
ción regional (dentro de la Unión Europea –UE-). Este estudio destaca cómo el aumento de la coo-
peración entre España y los Estados africanos en la interceptación de inmigrantes en los países de 
origen y tránsito ha alterado las rutas migratorias. Igualmente, se analiza la práctica española de las 
devoluciones en caliente de inmigrantes, tras los asaltos a las vallas fronterizas de Ceuta y Melilla, 
la llegada a nado a Ceuta o por vía marítima a las Islas y Peñones españoles en el norte de África, 
en el marco del acuerdo hispano-marroquí de readmisión de extranjeros entrados ilegalmente de 
1992. Finalmente, se plantea cómo el refuerzo del control fronterizo es insuficiente para frenar los 
flujos migratorios, si no se complementa con políticas comunes en los países europeos de destino y 
con mayores inversiones en los países de origen, que den a sus ciudadanos la oportunidad de tener 
un nivel de vida más alto y superar la tentación de emigrar, como primera opción.
PALABRAS CLAVE: Inmigración, España, rutas migratorias, Ceuta, Melilla, frontera, control 
fronterizo, acuerdo hispano-marroquí de readmisión, Marruecos, derechos humanos.
IMMIGRATION EN ESPAGNE: ROUTES MIGRATOIRES, COOPÉRATION AVEC LES 
PAYS TIERS ET DROITS DE L’HOMME DANS LES PROCÉDURES DE RETOUR
RESUME: Après une brève présentation de l’immigration en Espagne, les principales voies d’en-
trée en Espagne pour l’immigration clandestine sont analysées, ainsi que des données récentes sur 
le nombre d’arrivées par mer et par voie terrestre vers les territoires péninsulaire et baléare, les 
îles Canaries et les territoires espagnols en Afrique du nord. Les routes maritimes sont consoli-
dées en tant que forme traditionnelle d’accès au territoire espagnol pour les immigrants originaires 
principalement de l’Afrique subsaharienne. Une exception s’est produite entre 2013 et 2015, dans 
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laquelle l’immigration par voie terrestre était supérieure à la mer, en raison de l’augmentation du 
nombre d’immigrants syriens dans les villes de Ceuta et, principalement, de Melilla. L’analyse 
porte en particulier sur les mécanismes politiques et opérationnels mis en place par les autorités 
espagnoles pour maintenir le contrôle de leurs frontières maritimes, notamment aux îles Canaries. 
Ces frontières maritimes sont contrôlées par des mesures de surveillance unilatérales (Système 
de surveillance externe intégré –SIVE-), une coopération bilatérale (accords entre États avec le 
Maroc et d’autres pays d’Afrique subsaharienne) et une coopération régionale (au sein de l’Union 
européenne –UE-). Cette étude souligne en quoi la coopération accrue entre l’Espagne et les États 
africains en matière d’interception des immigrants dans les pays d’origine et de transit a modifié 
les itinéraires de migration. De même, la pratique espagnole des renvois ou refoulements ‘à chaud’ 
d’immigrants est analysée, après les assauts contre les barrières frontalières de Ceuta et Melilla, les 
arrivées en nageant à Ceuta ou par voie de mer dans les îles, les îlots et les rochers espagnoles  en 
Afrique du Nord ; pratique espagnole qui a comme cadre juridique l’accord de réadmission hispa-
no-marocain de 1992 pour les étrangers entrés illégalement. Enfin, le renforcement des contrôles 
aux frontières est insuffisant pour freiner les flux migratoires, s’il n’est pas complété par des politi-
ques communes dans les pays européens de destination et par des investissements plus importants 
dans les pays d’origine, qui donnent à leurs citoyens la possibilité d’un niveau de vie plus élevé et 
de vaincre la tentation d’émigrer, comme première option.
MOTS CLES : Immigration, Espagne, routes migratoires, Ceuta, Melilla, frontières, contrôle des 
frontières, accord de réadmission hispano-marocain, Maroc, droits de l’homme.
I. INTRODUCTION
The aproval of  the European Agenda on Migration has meant an unprec-
edented effort by the EU in the past four years to address the challenge of  
migration2, which has contributed to reducing irregular arrivals to the low-
est level in 5 years. Nevertheless, the recent rise in irregular arrivals in the 
Western Mediterranean shows that the situation remains volatile and that 
smugglers are constantly looking for new opportunities. In this sense, on the 
Western Mediterranean/Atlantic route, arrivals increased last year. The total 
number of  arrivals to Spain in 20183 (almost 65,000 people) was 131% high-
2 In May 2015, the European Commission presented a comprehensive  European Agenda 
on Migration, intended to address immediate challenges and equip the EU with the tools to 
better manage migration in the medium and long term in the areas of  irregular migration, 
borders, asylum and legal migration. See Doc. COM (2015) 240 final, Brussels, 13.5.2015, 
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the Eu-
ropean Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of  the Regions, A European 
Agenda on Migration.
3 In 2018, the Western Mediterranean became the most frequently used route into Europe. 
The number of  detections in 2018 doubled for the second consecutive year to a record high 
of  57,034. Morocco was the main departure point to Europe for irregular migrants. Most of  
the migratory pressure registered on this route was linked to migrants originating from sub-
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er than in 20174, and this trend has continued in 20195. Moroccans were the 
largest single nationality arriving in Spain in 2018 (a fifth of  the total cross-
ings), followed by nationals of  West African countries – Guinea, Mali, Côte 
d’Ivoire and The Gambia – as well as Algeria6.
According to data published by the Office of  the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), a total of  27,611 immigrants and 
refugees arrived in Spain (sea arrivals: 22,400 and land arrivals 5,211) between 
1 January and 10 November 20197.
Saharan countries. However, towards the end of  2018, the number of  Moroccan migrants 
began to increase. Migrants claiming to be minors accounted for 9% of  the arrivals on this 
route. Overall, on both land and sea routes, Moroccans were the top detected nationality, 
followed by Guineans, Malians and Algerians. See <https://frontex.europa.eu/along-eu-
borders/migratory-routes/western-mediterranean-route/>.
4 The number of  migrants detected reaching Spain from northern Africa jumped to 23,063 
in 2017. Two of  every five migrants were nationals of  Algeria and Morocco. Most of  the 
remaining people on this route came from Western Africa. Ibidem.
5 In 2019 there has been a steady increase in irregular migration from the African 
continent, especially from West Africa. The main reasons for this increase is the instability 
in the countries of  origin and transit. Despite the increasing smuggling prices this year, 
the Western Mediterranean Route is still more affordable compared with other maritime 
routes. An important factor in this context is also the short distance between the departure 
points and the Spanish shores. The recent use of  powerful speed boats (usually involved 
in hashish smuggling), which can transport large numbers of  migrants in a shorter time, 
could be another reason in the increasing number of  arrivals. In addition, the dismantling of  
makeshift migrant camps in Morocco and Algeria might act as a ‘push factor’ in displacing 
migrants to other areas. See <https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/focus/focus-on-
western-mediterreanean-route-frontex-in-spain-isGpCE>.
6 Doc. COM (2019) 126 final, Brussels, 6.3.2019, Communication from the Commission to 
the European Parliament, the European Council and the Council, Progress report on the 
Implementation of  the European Agenda on Migration, pp. 1-3.
7 See <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/country/esp>. A total of  17,430 immigrants and refu-
gees arrived in Spain between 1 January and 30 September 2017 (http://data2.unhcr.org/
en/situations/mediterranean/location/5226), almost double the number of  those recorded 
in the previous year for the same period (9,148). Arrivals by sea accounted for most of  this 
increase in immigration (12,420 compared with 5,446 in 2016), but arrivals by land to the 
autonomous cities of  Ceuta (1,922) and Melilla (3,506) have also escalated (a total of  5,010 
compared with 3,702 in 2016). These cities have also witnessed a rise in arrivals by sea, to 
a greater extent in Ceuta than in Melilla, including arrivals to the Spanish islands and islets 
in North Africa. The data for 2016 is available in the report of  the Spanish Commission 
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Maritime routes thus comprise the main gateway for irregular immigra-
tion to Spain, principally to the Andalusian coast (with 17,947 immigrants 
between 1 January and 10 November 2019), followed by the Mediterranean 
coast (1,539 between January and 3 November 2019) and the Canary Islands 
(1,493 arrivals)8. This predominance has been heightened by the Spanish Go-
vernment’s decision to reinforce the border fences surrounding Ceuta and 
Melilla, following the first mass assaults on the fences in 20059, and adopt 
a new “procedure” of  rejection at the border in these cities, which entered 
into force on 1 April 201510. But the number of  immigrants arriving by land 
for Refugee Aid (Spanish initials: CEAR), Movimientos migratorios en España y Europa, 2016, 
<https://www.cear.es/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Informe-rutas-migratorias.pdf>.
The only time the number of  immigrants arriving in Spain by land surpassed 
the number arriving by sea was in the period 2013 to 2015, mainly due to increased 
immigration from Syria.The arrival of  3,305 people from Syria to Ceuta and Melilla 
in 2014 marked a new trend that has increased migration flows in Ceuta and above all, 
in Melilla. See Balance 2014 Lucha contra la Inmigración Irregular, Spanish Ministry of  the 
Interior, p. 9 in <http://www.interior.gob.es/documents/10180/3066430/Balance+
2014+de+la+lucha+contra+la+inmigraci%C3%B3n+irregular/4a33ce71-3834-44fc-
9fbf-7983ace6cec4>. This number rose to 7,189 in 2015, a much higher figure than that 
for other nationalities arriving in Ceuta and Melilla that year (a total of  4,435, mostly 
from Sub-Saharan Africa). See Balance 2015 Lucha contra la Inmigración Irregular, Spanish 
Ministry of  the Interior, in <http://www.interior.gob.es/documents/10180/3066430/
Balance+2015+de+la+lucha+contra+la+inmigraci%C3%B3n+irregular.pdf/d67e7d4b-
1cb9-4b1d-94a0-9a9ca1028f3d>.
8 <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/country/esp>. 
9 According to the above-mentioned 2014 report: “In 2014 there were close to 19,000 as-
saults on the fences at Melilla (350% more than in 2013). Thanks to deterrent measures 
and to the work of  the State Security Forces, 90% of  the assailants did not enter Ceuta or 
Melilla”, p.10. 
10 In 2015, attempts to assault the border fences at Ceuta and Melilla fell by 67.8%, while 
entries to both cities using this method dropped by 78%.  Balance 2015…, cit., p. 11.
Immigration in Spain: Migratory Routes, Cooperation with Third Countries and Human Rights in Return Procedures 
Paix et Securité Internationales
ISSN 2341-0868, Num. 7, janvier-décembre 2019, pp. 201-230
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.25267/Paix_secur_int.2019.i7.06
206
and sea in Ceuta (between 1 January and 10 November 2019) was 1,66511 and 
4,575 to Melilla12 in the same period.
The immigration by sea to Spain was mainly increased in 2017. In this 
sense, the first seven months of  2017, the number of  immigrants reaching 
the Spanish coast tripled. This fact has coincided with the application of  stric-
ter measures against human trafficking by sea between Libya and Italy13 and 
the consequent decline in maritime immigration by this route, and with “less 
surveillance” along the Moroccan coast, which some NGO have attributed to 
the unrest in the Rif  region that Morocco has witnessed in that year14.
However, a comparison between data on maritime immigration in 2006, 
the year of  the cayucos crisis (with 39,180 immigrants: 31,678 to the Canary 
Islands and 7,502 to the Peninsula and Balearic Islands), and more recent data 
of  2019 reflects the changes in border control and migration flow manage-
ment that have been implemented by Spain in conjunction with the countries 
of  origin and transit of  immigrants primarily from Sub-Saharan Africa.
In the first section below, the main immigration routes (sea and land) to 
Spain used by human trafficking mafias will be analysed, paying particular at-
tention to the drop in maritime immigration to the Canary Islands following 
the 2006 cayucos crisis. This decline has been due to Spanish cooperation with 
third countries (mainly Morocco, Senegal and Mauritania) and institutional 
cooperation within the EU, both of  which have served to reduce migration 
11 1,163 immigrants by land (35,4% less than in 2018 with 1,799) and 535 by sea (34,4% 
more than in 2018 with 398). See Informe Quincenal sobre inmigración irregular. Datos acumulados 
desde el 1 enero al 14 noviembre de 2019, Ministerio del Interior, Gobierno de España, <http://
www.interior.gob.es/documents/10180/11113854/informe_quincenal_acumulado_01-01_
al_14-11-2019.pdf/2b97a27e-fc46-433d-b3b6-05ab0cb446dc>.
12 4,053 immigrants by land (2,4% less than in 2018 with 4,153) and 485 by sea (27,1% less 
than in 2018 with 665). Ibidem.
13 BBC Mundo (21.08.2017): “Por qué España vuelve a ser ruta principal para los inmigrantes 
que buscan entrar en Europa por el Mediterráneo?” and “La crisis migratoria llega a España” 
(06.09.2017), <https://es.gatestoneinstitute.org/10950/crisis-migratoria-espana>.
14 Elpais.com (14.09.2017): “La ruta española de pateras alcanza cifras de 2008”. The situation 
in the Rif  region of  Morocco, the main transit country for migrants heading to Spain, created 
an opportunity for more departures from its western coast in the second half  of  the year. 
This was coupled with a growing use of  high-capacity boats capable of  transporting large 
numbers of  migrants. See <https://frontex.europa.eu/along-eu-borders/migratory-routes/
western-mediterranean-route/>.
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flows across the Atlantic, but have also spurred the quest for new routes of  
entry to Spain through Spanish territories in North Africa.
The second section will be focused on the arrival of  immigrants in the 
autonomous cities of  Ceuta and Melilla and to Spanish islands and islets in 
North Africa. In both cases, the Spanish practice of  summary returns has 
aroused criticism. Although the Spanish Government adopted a new legal 
framework in 2015 with respect to the special regime of  Ceuta and Melilla 
aimed at providing a legal basis for these returns (i.e. rejection at the border), 
this would not be applicable to immigrants who arrive by swimming to these 
cities, nor to those arriving in boats to Spanish islands and islets off  the Mo-
roccan coast.
To conclude, it will be discussed the economic measures that Spain and 
the EU have adopted in the field of  development cooperation with the aim 
of  improving conditions in countries of  origin that encourage their citizens 
to seek a better, “safer” life on the European continent.
II. SEA AND LAND IMMIGRATION ROUTES TO SPAIN: COOPERATION WITH THIRD 
COUNTRIES TO FIGHT IRREGULAR IMMIGRATION
There are two main routes to Spain for immigrants seeking to enter irre-
gurarly15.
One is the West African route, which encompasses sea crossings to the Ca-
nary Islands from countries such as Senegal, Mauritania and Morocco. The 
main countries of  origin of  the immigrants and refugees who use this route 
are Morocco, Senegal, Niger, Nigeria and Mali: in 2017, the majority of  arri-
vals corresponded to nationals from Morocco, Guinea and Ivory Coast.
In 2019, 1,493 immigrants arrived by sea to the Canary Islands16 in com-
parison with the 17,947 immigrants arriving to Andalucia. The decline in 
immigration by this route after the cayucos crisis, which in 2012 reached its 
lowest figures yet with 173 immigrants17, has been due to agreements on the 
deployment of  Spanish and EU sea and air patrols in the waters of  these 
African countries; to the efforts of  the Spanish police and authorities in the 
15 <http://frontex.europa.eu/trends-and-routes/migratory-routes-map/>.
16 It means 270 immigrants more (22,1%) than in 2018 (1,223). See Informe Quincenal sobre 
inmigración irregular…,  cit.
17 Balance 2015…, cit, p. 8.
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field of  repatriation; and to increased police cooperation in Africa, which has 
led to an increase in detentions on land and the consequent dismantling of  
mafia networks operating there18.
Of  particular note has been the creation of  joint Spanish and Moroccan 
patrols as a result of  bilateral agreements on immigration signed by Spain 
and Morocco at the Marrakesh Summit held on 8 and 9 December 2003. The 
first patrol, launched in February 2004, consisted of  members of  the Spanish 
Civil Guard Naval Service and the Royal Moroccan Gendarmerie. Initially, 
two civil guards patrolled on Moroccan vessels in the area of  Laayoune, but 
following the Marbella Summit in January 2004, this was extended to the area 
around the Strait of  Gibraltar and the Atlantic region (Las Palmas, Laayoune, 
Algeciras-Tangiers and Nador-Almeria)19.
The creation in 2002 of  the Integrated External Surveillance System (Spa-
nish initials: SIVE)20 and the Spanish-Moroccan police cooperation launched 
in 2004 together prompted human trafficking mafias to seek a more southerly 
destination, the Canary Islands, which at the end of  2005 witnessed the first 
avalanche of  immigrants.
Since the beginning of  the cayucos crisis, the Spanish Government has 
adopted various operational measures to combat new routes of  irregular im-
migration. Thus, in March 2006, an agreement was reached with Mauritania to 
18 Vélez AlcAlde, F. J., “Pateras, cayucos y mafias transfronterizas en África: el negocio de 
las rutas atlánticas hacia las Islas Canarias”, ARI nº 14/2008 (05/02/2008), Real Instituto 
Elcano, at 6.
19 AcostA sánchez, M. A. and del VAlle GálVez, A. del, “La crisis de los cayucos. La Agen-
cia Europea de Fronteras FRONTEX y el control marítimo de la inmigración clandestina”, 
Tiempo de Paz, nº 83, 2006, pp. 19-30.
20 The SIVE is an operational system with technical support that provides real-time information 
to a Control Centre which then issues the necessary orders to intercept any element approach-
ing national territory from the sea. The prototype Centre is based in Algeciras and covers the 
entire Strait of  Gibraltar area. This system uses cutting-edge technology (a complex network of  
mobile and fixed sensors) to detect small boats departing from Morocco, and is capable of  ac-
curately detecting the smallest boats on North African beaches, even under adverse conditions. 
The effectiveness of  this system, which has enabled Spanish security forces to promptly detect 
and detain boats before their arrival onshore, rapidly created the need to seek other landing 
places. Subsequently, this system was gradually extended to cover the provinces of  Cadiz, Mal-
aga and Granada, the autonomous city of  Ceuta and the island of  Fuerteventura in the Canary 
Islands. According to sources in the Spanish Ministry of  the Interior (20/08/2008), the Civil 
Guard has reinforced control of  irregular immigration in Cadiz with a new mobile SIVE sensor 
station, which will monitor the coastline between Barbate and Conil de la Frontera.
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create joint patrols (operation Cabo Blanco), and the Mauritanian gendarmerie 
was given four patrol boats and training for the staff  that would be working 
on them. In Spain, military buildings were equipped to receive immigrants 
and the Canary Islands security forces were strengthened. It was also agreed 
to extend the SIVE system to Tenerife. In addition to these measures, on 28 
July 2006, the Council of  Ministers adopted the 2006-2008 Comprehensive 
Security Plan for the Canary Islands. Finally, to further strengthen existing 
measures, on 10 October 2006, the Council of  Ministers approved the agree-
ment establishing the creation of  the Canary Islands Regional Coordination 
Centre (Spanish initials: CCRC), which incorporated the FRONTEX Coor-
dination and Control Centre (FCCC).
The need for a combined and comprehensive European strategy to com-
bat irregular immigration, with economic and material support from the EU, 
led the Spanish Government to bring this matter before its European part-
ners. As a result, in May 2006 Spain spearheaded a working group to stren-
gthen the control of  irregular immigration from Africa. At a meeting held 
in Madrid on 29 May 2006 under the direction of  FRONTEX and with the 
equal participation of  the European Commission and Europol, Member Sta-
tes reached an agreement to launch a joint operation in the area of  origin of  
immigrant boats. Spain, Germany, Austria, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Fran-
ce, Italy, Norway, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal and the United Kingdom 
all offered to collaborate in the operation. European support was further evi-
denced at the European Council held in Brussels in June 2006, which welco-
med the cooperation measures adopted by the Commission, FRONTEX and 
some Member States as a result of  the situation in the Canary Islands and the 
Mediterranean. In addition, calls were made to intensify efforts to establish 
operational maritime cooperation that would enable effective monitoring of  
maritime borders, and to create rapid border intervention teams.
FRONTEX coordinated two operations. In the first of  these, called Hera 
I, European experts were deployed to identify irregular immigrants arriving 
in the Canary Islands and determine their country of  origin. The second, 
known as Hera II, was launched on 11 August 2006 and was aimed at contro-
lling irregular immigration via the Atlantic. This was a humanitarian operation 
aimed at increasing surveillance of  the coasts from which the boats trans-
porting irregular immigrants from Africa to the Canary Islands departed, in 
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order to prevent their departure, or failing that, to intercept the boats in their 
territorial waters and return the immigrants to the Mauritanian21, Senegalese22 
or Cape Verde authorities. The operation was subsequently extended to Gui-
nea-Bissau23. Furthermore, it was in line with the July 2007 Rabat Action Plan 
for a Euro-African Partnership on Migration and Development. The initial 
duration of  Hera II was between eight to nine weeks, but was subsequently 
extended through new dispositions.
Also of  note was the Seahorse Project (2006-2008) adopted by the Eu-
ropean Commission and spearheaded by Spain. The specific objectives of  
this project24 were to establish an effective policy in the countries affected 
to prevent irregular immigration, which would include efforts to stop hu-
man trafficking; to establish and develop relations between the Maghreb and 
21 Thus, Spain reactivated the readmission agreement with Mauritania. See the Agreement on 
Immigration between the Kingdom of  Spain and the Islamic Republic of  Mauritania, signed in 
Madrid on 1 July 2003, the Official State Gazette (BOE) No. 185, 4 August 2003. On 22 September 
2017, the Spanish Council of  Ministers approved the signing of  a new cooperation agreement 
with Mauritania to strengthen and reinforce police cooperation between the two countries 
in the fight against irregular immigration, among other matters. See europapress (22.09.2017): 
“España y Mauritania reforzarán su colaboración en la lucha contra la inmigración irregular y 
el terrorismo”, <http://www.europapress.es/sociedad/noticia-espana-mauritania-reforzaran-
colaboracion-lucha-contra-inmigracion-irregular-terrorismo-20170922151004.html>.
22 In Dakar on 24 August 2006, Senegal and Spain signed a Memorandum of  Understanding 
to combat irregular immigration to Europe from the coasts of  Senegal, establishing joint 
patrols with the Spanish Civil Guard and Senegalese security forces to intercept immigrant 
boats destined for the Canary Islands. Since then it has been extended, as in 2009, when the 
Memorandum of  police cooperation was signed with Mauritania. See Ministry of  the Interior 
press release (03.11.2009): “Firma de dos Memorandos de cooperación policial con Senegal y 
Mauritania [Signing of  two Memoranda on police cooperation with Senegal and Mauritania]”. 
Recently, Spain and Senegal have signed a joint declaration, which will lead to the negotiation 
of  a new Memorandum of  Cooperation between the two countries. See Ministry of  the 
Interior press release (20.07.2017): “España  y Senegal acuerdan intensificar la cooperación 
bilateral para luchar contra el terrorismo, el crimen organizado y el narcotráfico, y reforzar la 
gestión de los flujos migratorios [Spain and Senegal have agreed to intensify bilateral cooper-
ation to combat terrorism, organised crime and drug trafficking, and to strengthen migration 
flow management]”.
23 Due to the greater control exercised in Senegal, immigrant boats bound for the Canary 
Islands began to depart from the even more distant Guinea Bissau. 
24 See “VI Conferencia euro-africana sobre inmigración irregular” (18.10.2011), <http://
www.guardiacivil.es/es/prensa/noticias/historico2/3220.html>.
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Sub-Saharan Africa, and foster dialogue on migration issues; to promote re-
gional collaboration and dialogue on migration flow management, including 
transit and migration, irregular immigration and human trafficking; to provi-
de training for staff  dealing with migration issues; and to assess and improve 
the capacity to implement border control through operational cooperation.
This project was later enhanced by the creation of  the Seahorse Network 
(2007-2008), which established a secure satellite information exchange ne-
twork, with local points of  contact in Mauritania, Cape Verde, Senegal and 
Portugal, and a South Atlantic Border Cooperation Centre in Las Palmas. 
Seahorse Project Cooperation Centres (2009-2010) transformed the points 
of  contact into coordination centres similar to the Canary Islands Regional 
Coordination Centre (CCRC).
In the context of  these projects, many actions were carried out in Moroc-
co, Senegal, Mauritania, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde, Portugal and 
Spain between 2006 and 2010. Lastly, a communications network (Seahorse 
Atlantic) was created with a centre in each of  the participating countries (ex-
cept for Mauritania, which has two) to enable operational coordination and 
permanent and secure information exchange via satellite25.
In order to consolidate relations and cooperation with these countries, in 
late 2010 the European Commission launched the West Sahel Project (2011-
2016), whose beneficiaries would be the countries in the Western Sahel, 
mainly Mauritania, Senegal, Mali and Niger, with the participation in some 
activities of  Cape Verde, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, the Republic of  Guinea 
and Burkina Faso. All these projects have subsequently continued within the 
context of  the proposal put forward by Spain, the Blue Sahel Project (2017-
2019), aimed at coordination between the Spanish Civil Guard and the autho-
rities of  seven countries in the Sahel region to combat irregular immigration, 
drug trafficking and terrorism. The project consists of  creating cross-border 
patrols and intelligence units, as well as training actions and cooperation with 
these countries.
These projects and Spain’s bilateral cooperation with Mauritania and Se-
negal have virtually closed the sea route from West Africa for immigrants 
from these countries.
25 See spAnish Ministry of the interior (15.12.2010): “El Director General de la Policía y 
de la Guardia Civil asiste a la reunión del Proyecto Seahorse sobre control de la inmigración 
irregular por vía marítima”.
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However, Amnesty International has denounced the practice of  summary 
expulsion26 (i.e. the summary return of  undocumented immigrants without 
respecting due process or these immigrants’ human rights), in relation to the 
readmission agreement that Spain signed with Mauritania in 2003. Spain had 
signed agreements with Morocco, Algeria, Mauritania and Guinea-Bissau to 
return irregular immigrants intercepted at sea27, and after the cayucos crisis, 
also with Ghana, Cape Verde, the Republic of  Guinea, Mali, Gambia, Niger 
and Senegal. It is interesting to note that several of  these agreements provide 
for the possibility of  joint border control patrols in waters under the sove-
reignty or jurisdiction of  the third State (e.g. the agreement with Cape Verde), 
with the implicit support of  FRONTEX. This entails the participation of  
members of  the Spanish Civil Guard on Spanish and third country vessels, 
performing border control tasks in maritime areas under the sovereignty or 
jurisdiction of  a third State. The purpose is to prevent the launch of  Eu-
rope-bound vessels carrying irregular immigrants and return these to their 
point of  origin, even if  they are nationals of  the third State.
Thus, border guards from Member States are carrying out surveillance 
tasks beyond the European borders defined in the Schengen Borders Code, 
in order to control and prevent the arrival —or even the mere approach— 
of  irregular immigrants to Europe’s external maritime borders. In this sense, 
the UN Committee against Torture (subject matter: Detention of  23 Indian 
immigrations in Mauritania under Spanish control), considered in 2008 that 
the jurisdiction of  a State party “must also include situations where a State 
party exercises, directly or indirectly, de facto o de jure control over persons 
in detention”. The Committee observed that Spain maintained control over 
the persons on board the cargo vessel Marine I from the time it was rescued in 
international waters and throughout the identification and repatriation pro-
cess of  the immigrants. The 23 alleged victims, who refused to sign volun-
tary repatriation agreements, remained in detention under Spanish control in 
26 See AMnesty internAtionAl Report “Mauritania: Nadie quiere tener nada que ver con 
nosotros”. Elmundo.es (01.07.2008): “España ‘obliga’ a Mauritania a arrestar y expulsar de 
forma colectiva a los inmigrantes”.
27 On the complex and varied legal nature of  these Agreements and Memoranda of  Unders-
tanding, see VAlle GAlVez, A. del, “Mesures nationales sur le trafic illégal de personnes et la 
criminalité transnationale organisée” in Sobrino Heredia, J.M. (Dir.), Sûreté maritime et violence 
en mer, Bruylant, Bruxelles, 2011, pp. 19-28.
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Nouadhibou (Mauritania) in a former fish-procedding plant. The Committee 
observed that Spain exercised, “by virtue of  a diplomatic agreement conclu-
ded with Mauritania, constant de facto control over the alleged victims during 
their detention in Nouadhibou”28.
Meanwhile, the Western Mediterranean route encompasses the Moroc-
can-Spanish area and includes both sea and land routes. A decade ago, im-
migrants using this route mainly came from Morocco and Algeria, but these 
have now been joined by nationals from war-torn countries such as Mali, 
Sudan, South Sudan, Cameroon, Nigeria, Chad and the Central African Re-
public, among others. In recent years, it has also been used by people from 
Syria, who in 2015 formed the most numerous group, with 7,189 immigrants 
compared with 3,305 in the previous year. Between January and September 
of  2019, 27,611 immigrants were recorded, mostly from Morocco (29,4 %), 
Guinea (12,9 %), Algeria (12,2 %) and Mali (11,4 %)29.
Spain has also strengthened bilateral cooperation on this route with the 
countries of  origin and transit, as mentioned earlier, as well as cooperation 
within the framework of  the EU and the G6.
Major actions include the Seahorse Mediterranean Project30, approved by 
the European Commission in 2013 for a period of  three years, with the par-
ticipation of  Spain, France, Italy, Malta, Portugal, Cyprus, Greece and Libya.
In addition, at a meeting of  Interior Ministers of  the G6 (Germany, Po-
land, Spain, France, the UK and Italy) held on 6 November 2014, Spain re-
iterated its commitment to strengthening the border control and migration 
management capacities of  both the EU and the countries of  origin and tran-
sit, as well as the operational capacities of  FRONTEX. The Spanish Minister 
highlighted the three FRONTEX maritime operations led by Spain (Indalo 
and Minerva in the Mediterranean and Hera in Senegalese waters, this being a 
unique case since it is the only FRONTEX operation in African waters), and 
28 Decision of  the Committee against Torture (Forty-first session, 3-21 November 2008), 
Communication no. 323/2007, CAT/C/41/D/323/2007, 21 November 2008, accessible in 
<https://cutt.ly/crqF821>.
29 <http://frontex.europa.eu/trends-and-routes/migratory-routes-map/>; “Movimientos 
migratorios en España y Europa, cit., pp. 9-10 and <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/country/
esp>, cit.
30 <http://www.interior.gob.es/prensa/noticias/-/asset_publisher/GHU8Ap6ztgsg/con-
tent/id/1827498>.
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reaffirmed Spain’s commitment to continue providing material and human 
resources, in this case in the Triton operation in Italy. As particularly effective 
measures to strengthen the border control and migration management capa-
cities of  the countries of  origin and transit, Spain proposed the establishment 
of  joint investigation teams with these countries, and the coordination of  
return actions with FRONTEX and the International Organisation for Mi-
gration (IOM).
Furthermore, at the meeting of  the G6 held in Seville on 16 October 
2017, with the participation of  senior representatives of  the Interior from 
the EU and Morocco, the Interior Ministers agreed to strengthen coope-
ration with key countries in the fight against irregular immigration, such as 
Morocco, Mauritania, Senegal, Niger and Libya, with the aim of  countering 
immigration pressure on the Mediterranean. At this meeting, the five cor-
nerstones of  cooperation on immigration were defined: prevention at source 
through cooperation with countries of  origin and transit; operational projects 
on the ground; the fight against human trafficking networks; border control; 
and return. To achieve these objectives, concrete measures were envisaged to 
prevent the movement of  irregular immigrants, such as assisting in capaci-
ty-building for border control in Sub-Saharan Africa and the Sahel; providing 
technical assistance to monitor sea and land borders; continuing to facilitate 
economic and social development on immigration routes, creating a sustaina-
ble alternative for immigrants in countries of  origin and transit; and suppor-
ting the work of  the UNHCR and IOM.
Related to the cooperating with Morocco, in late 2018, the EU approved 
EUR 140 million in support in border management and budget support and 
EUR 36 million in emergency assistance to help Spain on its southern bor-
der31.
Lastly, it should be noted that depending on the origin of  the immigrants, 
two methods are used to enter Spain via Ceuta and Melilla: one is to enter at 
31 Morocco has already been working to strengthen control of  its border and has prevent-
ed a large number of  departures. According to European Border and Coast Guard JORA 
data (Joint Operations Reporting Application), the Moroccan authorities prevented in 2018 
almost 15,000 irregular migrants from departing from Morocco by sea. The Moroccan au-
thorities are also conducting preventive actions inland. The Moroccan Ministry of  Interior 
estimates that 88,761 migrants departures from Morocco were prevented in 2018. See Doc. 
COM (2019) 126 final, cit., p. 5.
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border posts and the other by “assaulting” these posts or by attempts to jump 
the border fences surrounding Spanish territory in North Africa. Sub-Saharan 
African immigrants do not have access to Spain via border posts, so jumps 
or assaults on border fences are relatively common and have been accompa-
nied by the Spanish practice of  summary returns. This policy dates back to 
2005 and has continued ever since, and has also been employed following the 
arrival of  immigrants by sea to Spanish islands and islets in North Africa or 
by swimming to the beaches of  the above-mentioned autonomous cities32.
This procedure is only possible thanks to cooperation between Spain and 
neighbouring Morocco, since the latter is the main point of  departure for 
immigrants arriving in Spain by the West Mediterranean route33. Cooperation 
on immigration is one of  the main areas of  Spanish-Moroccan relations; in 
contrast, within the framework of  EU-Morocco relations, ensuring respect 
32 See González GArcíA, I., “El Acuerdo España–Marruecos de readmisión de inmigrantes 
y su problemática aplicación: Las avalanchas de Ceuta y Melilla”, Anuario Español de Derecho 
Internacional, XXII, 2006, pp. 255-284; “La llegada de inmigrantes a Isla de Tierra en Alhuce-
mas: Crisis migratoria entre España y Marruecos y violaciones de Derechos Humanos”, Re-
vista Electrónica de Estudios Internacionales (REEI), no. 27 (2014), pp. 1-28; and “Rechazo en las 
fronteras exteriores europeas con Marruecos: Inmigración y derechos humanos en las vallas 
de Ceuta y Melilla, 2005-2017”, Revista General de Derecho Europeo (RGDE), no. 43 (2017), pp. 
17-57. See also the legal reports issued by the IUSMIGRANTE R+D+i Project (Iuspuniendi 
e inmigración irregular) (DER 2011-26449), coordinated by M. Martínez Escamilla, ‘Expul-
siones en caliente’. Cuando el Estado actúa al margen de la ley, 27 June 2014 (last modification on 18 
April 2016), pp. 1-21 in <http://eprints.ucm.es/25993/> and ‘Rechazos en frontera’: ¿Frontera 
sin derechos? Análisis de la disposición adicional décima de la Ley Orgánica 4/2000, de 1 de enero, sobre 
derechos y libertades de los extranjeros en España y su integración social, introducida por la Ley Orgánica 
4/2015, de 30 de marzo, de protección de la seguridad ciudadana, 13 April 2015, pp. 1-34 in <http://
eprints.ucm.es/29379/>. 
33 It should be noted that in the words of  S. zebdA, cooperation in this area is excellent, 
mainly following the creation of  joint patrols in 2004, the exchange of  liaison and informa-
tion officers and the signing of  the 2012 Agreement on the creation of  Spanish-Moroccan 
Police Cooperation Centres to coordinate the fight to prevent irregular immigration, among 
other goals. To this end, the Spanish Government has tripled spending on police cooperation 
with Morocco to increase control of  the southern border. In 2012, €33,637 were allocated 
to border surveillance cooperation, a figure which by 2014 had risen to €108,733. See “XI 
Reunión de Alto Nivel hispano-marroquí, junio de 2015: reflexiones sobre la cooperación en 
economía, seguridad y cultura”, Paix et Securité Internationales, 3, 2015, pp. 227-237 at p. 232. 
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for human rights has always played a major role34. This is reflected in the EU’s 
readmission agreements with third countries, and in particular with Morocco, 
whose fifteenth round of  formal negotiations was held on 10 May 201035.
III. ENTRY TO SPAIN VIA CEUTA, MELILLA AND SPANISH ISLANDS AND ISLETS IN 
NORTH AFRICA: THE 1992 SPANISH-MOROCCAN AGREEMENT ON READMISSION 
OF FOREIGNERS WHO HAVE ENTERED IRREGULARLY
Below, the distinctive features of  border control and migration flow ma-
nagement on the West Mediterranean route will be analysed in terms of  entry 
to Spanish territories in North Africa. In 2015, the Spanish Government 
adopted a new “procedure” with respect to the special regimen of  Ceuta and 
Melilla, consisting of  rejection at the border36, in order to provide a legal basis 
for the practice of  summary returns. However, in its judgement of  3 October 
2017, the European Court of  Human Rights (ECHR) condemned Spain for 
this practice, in this case for having summarily returned two Sub-Saharan 
Africans (from Mali and Ivory Coast) who had managed to scale the border 
fence at Melilla on 13 August 201437.
34 See Joint Declaration published after the EU-Morocco Summit, Granada, 7 March 2010, 
7220/10 (Presse 54), 10 March 2010. 
35 SEC (2011) 209, Brussels, 23.02.2011, Commission staff  working document accompanying 
the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, 
Evaluation of  the EU Readmission Agreements, EU Readmission Agreements: Brief  
overview of  State of  play, February 2011, at 3-4. See Europa Press (02.02.2017). “Bruselas, en 
dificultades para avanzar acuerdos de readmisión de inmigrantes con países norteafricanos”, 
including Morocco (whose negotiation has been blocked to date), Algeria, Tunisia and 
Jordan, in <http://www.europapress.es/internacional/noticia-bruselas-dificultades-avanzar-
acuerdos-readmision-inmigrantes-paises-norteafricanos-20170202151737.html>.
36 We question the appropriacy of  this new “procedure”, which to date (two years after its 
entry into force) has still not passed into the Aliens Regulation (see footnote 35). See our 
previous Studies GonzAlez GArciA I., “Rechazo en las fronteras exteriores europeas con 
Marruecos: inmigración y derechos humanos en las vallas de Ceuta y Melilla, 2005-2017”, 
Revista General de Derecho Europeo, Nº. 43, 2017; “The Spanish-Moroccan Cooperation on Im-
migration: The Summary Returns Cases of  Isla de Tierra-Alhucemas (2012) and Ceuta and 
Melilla (2014)” Spanish yearbook of  international law, Nº 19, 2015,  349
37 European Court of  Human Rights/Cour Européenne des Droits de l’Homme (Stras-
bourg), Troisième Section, Affaire N.D. et N.T. c. Espagne (Requêtes nºs 8675/15 et 
8697/15), Arrêt 3 octobre 2017. 
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1. THE SPECIAL REGIME OF CEUTA AND MELILLA: FROM AN OPERATIONAL 
CONCEPT OF BORDERS TO REJECTION AT THE BORDER
The border fences surrounding Ceuta and Melilla demarcate the land 
border of  Spain, and therefore the external borders between the EU and 
Morocco. Consequently, Spanish procedures for the return, expulsion or re-
admission of  immigrants seeking to enter the Schengen area irregularly must 
respect human rights.
Until 1996, the borders of  Ceuta and Melilla were protected by a wire fen-
ce in Ceuta (from 1993) and a military fence in Melilla (from 1971). However, 
between 1996 and 1999, the Spanish Government ordered the border with 
Morocco to be reinforced, and two parallel fences were erected enclosing an 
inner road for border surveillance. At the same time, the height of  the fences 
was increased from three metres in 2006 to six metres. That same year, while 
Spain was building a fence around the breakwater on the El Tarajal beach in 
Ceuta, Morocco was also digging a trench parallel to the fence outside the 
city, like the one already existing alongside the fence in Melilla. It was also 
agreed to raise a third fence or three-dimensional barrier in both cities, which 
was only erected in Melilla between the two already existing fences, reaching 
a height of  two metres. Since 2014, further reinforcements have been made 
to this fence.
However, the layout of  these fences does not coincide with Spain’s con-
ception of  them as being “for the sole purposes of  immigration”. Although 
the legal concept of  the border “is in accordance with the international trea-
ties entered into between the kingdoms of  Spain and Morocco”, the functio-
nal or operational concept of  the same “seems to respond to a political cri-
terion of  the Government, or to a simple police operation”38, as it effectively 
facilitates the criticised summary returns that have been carried out by the 
Spanish security forces since 2005 against immigrants who become trapped 
between the Ceuta or Melilla border fences or who have swum to these cities, 
because once these have crossed the inner fence or the line formed by the 
civil guards waiting on the beach, they are deemed irregular immigrants on 
Spanish soil39.
38 See the ruling of  the Court of  First Instance and Instruction No. 2 of  Melilla of  11 Sep-
tember 2014, Court Consideration no. 3. 
39 ‘Rechazos en frontera’: ¿Frontera sin derechos?, cit., p. 14.
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Indeed, the sad episode on 6 February 2014, when members of  the Civil 
Guard returned 23 immigrants who had swum to Ceuta’s El Tarajal beach to 
Morocco (with other 15 immigrants  drowned in Moroccan waters), clearly 
evidenced the concept of  operational border used by the Spanish security 
forces. The Minister of  the Interior, Mr Fernández Díaz, appeared in the 
Congress of  Deputies on 13 February 2014 to defend the actions of  the Civil 
Guard in applying this operational concept of  the border40, basing his argu-
ment on “the unique characteristics of  border control” in Ceuta and Melilla.
According to a ruling on 11 September 2014 of  the Court of  First Instan-
ce and Preliminary Investigation No. 2 in Melilla, the Civil Guard also used 
this concept of  an operational or functional border when on 18 June and 13 
August 2014, an undetermined number of  immigrants who had scaled the 
outer fence at Melilla and were in the space between the last two fences, or 
were on the upper part of  the inner fence at Melilla, respectively, were han-
ded over to the Moroccan authorities. This concept of  land border that the 
Civil Guard applies to the border fence at Melilla implies that “...the inner 
fence embodies the line that defines Spanish territory, for the sole purposes 
of  immigration”41.
In response to widespread criticism of  the practice of  summary returns 
and the numerous complaints lodged before national and international courts 
as being contrary to the provisions of  Spanish-Moroccan border treaties and 
international law on human rights, the Spanish Government introduced a 
series of  partial amendments to the organic law on the protection of  citizen 
security in order to “legalise” the practice. The tenth additional provision in 
40 The operational concept of  border used by the Ministry of  the Interior appears in the 
report of  8 February 2014 drawn up by the Civil Guard Deputy Directorate for Operations 
and addressed to its Directorate General, concerning the events on El Tarajal beach. The 
report was delivered by the Ministry of  the Interior to the Congress of  Deputies on 7 March 
2014. See the above-mentioned legal reports: ‘Expulsiones en caliente?’. Cuando el Estado actúa al 
margen de la ley, p. 6 and ‘Rechazos en frontera’: ¿Frontera sin derechos?, cit., p. 14. 
41 Concept applied to the fence in Melilla, according to the report of  the Civil Guard of  
the Autonomous City (submitted on 2 September 2014 to the Court of  First Instance and 
Instruction No. 2 in Melilla, Court Consideration no. 2.7 of  the ruling adopted by said Court 
on 11 September 2014), which refers to the Order of  Service 6/2014 entitled Dispositivo anti 
intrusión en la valla perimetral de Melilla y protocolo operativo de vigilancia de fronteras, signed by the 
Colonel-in-Chief  of  the Civil Guard Command in Melilla on 11 April 2014.
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the Aliens Act (Spanish initials: LOEx)42 incorporates “rejection at the bor-
der” in the following terms:
Special regime of  Ceuta and Melilla:
1. Foreigners detected at Ceuta’s and Melilla’s borders trying to 
pass the border barriers and cross the border irregularly can be 
rejected to avoid their irregular entry into Spain.
2. These rejections will be implemented respecting the internatio-
nal law on human rights and international protection ratified by 
Spain.
3. International protection claims will be formalised at the places 
designated to this effect at border posts in line with international 
protection obligations.
However, in its attempt to provide a legal basis for summary returns 
through rejection at the border, the Spanish Government forgot that the 
unique characteristics of  Ceuta and Melilla were already covered by Spanish 
legislation on immigration.
Thus, the LOEx and its Regulation43 already regulate the procedures for 
“refusal of  entry” at a designated border post when the person concerned 
does not have the required documentation and does not meet the require-
ments laid down in article 25 of  the LOEx to enter Spanish territory, as well 
as those for the “expulsion” and “return” of  aliens.
Expulsion occurs when a foreigner commits an offence classified as very 
serious or serious in the LOEx44 and applies to cases in which the foreigner 
is already on Spanish soil.
But under the terms of  article 58.3. b) of  the LOEx, an expulsion order is 
not necessary for the return of  foreigners intending to enter Spain irregularly, 
which includes foreigners who are intercepted at or nearby the border, under 
the terms of  article 23.1. b) of  the RLOEx. Regardless, the return shall be de-
42 Organic Law 4/2000, on the rights and freedoms of  foreigners in Spain and their social 
integration (BOE No. 10, 12 January 2000).
43 Royal Decree 557/2011, of  20 April, which approves the regulation of  Organic Law 
4/2000, on the rights and freedoms of  foreigners in Spain and their social integration, fol-
lowing its amendment by Organic Law 2/2009 (RLOEx). BOE No. 103, 30 April 2011.
44Art. 57.1 LOEx.
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cided by the governing authority responsible for expulsion, which in the case 
of  single province autonomous communities is the Government Delegate45. 
Consequently, this return procedure renders rejection at the border unne-
cessary. The provisions of  the RLOEx also establish procedural safeguards, 
indicating that when the State security forces responsible for guarding coasts 
and borders intercept such foreigners, they should conduct these as soon as 
possible to the corresponding police station of  the National Police for iden-
tification and, where appropriate, return46. These safeguards are also intended 
to ensure respect for their human rights, expressly recognising their right to 
legal assistance, and an interpreter where necessary, in accordance with article 
23.3. They furthermore provide for the possibility of  requesting the legal au-
thorities for permission to intern the immigrant in an immigration detention 
centre (Spanish initials: CIE) in the event that a return cannot be executed 
within 72 hours47.
Applying the legal concept of  border in the terms agreed by Spain and 
Morocco for Ceuta and Melilla (whose borders are represented by fences, 
where the outer fence is the border between Spanish territory and the nei-
ghbouring country), any immigrant trapped within the double/triple border 
fence, found climbing a fence or who has managed to scale them and is 
detained in their vicinity falls under Spanish jurisdiction and sovereignty for 
the purposes of  immigration, because the fences are Spanish and are built on 
Spanish soil.
This is contrary to the provisions of  paragraph 1 of  the tenth additional 
provision of  the LOEx, in which the operational concept of  border is im-
plicit. Therefore, we can conclude that the new procedure of  rejection at the 
border not only violates the procedural safeguards established by Spanish 
law on immigration, but also breaches international treaties on human rights 
to which Spain is a party. This contravenes explicit recognition in paragra-
phs 2 (human rights) and 3 (international protection) of  the tenth additional 
provision of  the LOEx, indicating that written provisions do not guarantee 
compliance in practice.
45 Art. 58.5 LOEx.
46 Art. 23.2 RLOEx.
47 Art. 58.4 LOEx and art. 23.4 RLOEx. 
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Rejection at the border is intended for application to immigrants seeking 
to enter Ceuta and Melilla irregularly by climbing over the border fences (thus 
differentiating between rejection at the border and refusal of  entry at the 
border post), but paragraph 2, which stipulates that such rejection should res-
pect international human rights and international protection, is contingent on 
application for international protection being formalised at the places desig-
nated to this effect at border posts. However, as has been reported, Sub-Saha-
ran immigrants have no access to these border posts due to repression from 
the Moroccan authorities48.
2. HUMAN RIGHTS IN RETURN PROCEDURES
National immigration laws, the Spanish one included, are constrained by 
international customary an treaty law, which imposes limits intended to ensu-
re respect for the dignity of  human beings, this being the minimum standard 
of  international protection accorded to foreign nationals, including irregular 
immigrants. Special mention should be made of  the provisions concerning 
protection of  the right of  asylum and subsidiary protection, and in particular, 
of  compliance with the provisional guarantees of  entry and stay granted to 
foreigners by the receiving State, and the principle of  non-refoulement.
Focusing on the right to seek asylum, irregular entry into Spanish territory 
cannot be punished, according to Spanish domestic law, when such entry has 
been effected by foreign nationals who meet the requirements to qualify for 
the status of  refugees, provided they present themselves without delay to the 
authorities. In this case, expulsion or return should be suspended from the 
moment the foreign national requests the protection conferred by asylum 
until a decision is issued on the application admitted for processing49.
Moreover, this right is recognised in the Geneva Convention of  28 July 
1951 on the status of  refugees, in its protocol of  31 January 1967, of  which 
the Spain is a party 50, and in EU law.
48 See the Servicio Jesuita a Migrantes-España Reports: Vidas en la Frontera Sur, 17 July 2014 
and Sin protección en la frontera. Derechos humanos en la frontera sur: Entre Nador y Melilla, 22 May 
2016. 
49 Art. 23.6.b) RLOEx and art. 58.4 LOEx. 
50 The State of  Morocco is also party to the Geneva Convention and its Protocol, since 1956 
and 1971, respectively. 
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Thus, the directive on return establishes several procedural guarantees 
for nationals of  third countries subject to return51 (including respect for the 
principle of  non-refoulement), in accordance with fundamental rights and, 
in particular, the EU Charter of  Fundamental Rights (EUCFR). These in-
clude respect for human dignity; the right to life; the prohibition of  the tor-
ture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; the prohibition 
of  trafficking in human beings; the right to liberty and security; the right of  
asylum and protection against repatriation and expulsion; and the principle 
of  non-refoulement.
Hence, EU-third country readmission agreements cannot be applied to 
persons who might be subject to persecution, torture or inhuman or de-
grading treatment or punishment in the country of  return, nor can they be 
applied in these cases to citizens of  third countries (who are not nationals 
of  any of  the parties), pursuant to the third country nationals (TCN) clause 
contained in all readmission agreements.
In the present case, the EU-Morocco agreement on mobility (EU-Morocco 
Mobility Partnership), signed on 7 June 2013, includes the TCN clause, thus 
establishing respect for human rights, in order to strengthen collaboration in 
the management of  migration and mobility of  Moroccan citizens.
On the other hand, fundamental rights (e.g. the right to life and the phy-
sical or moral integrity and legality of  foreign nationals who are under the 
jurisdiction of  a State) must be observed and ensured in expulsion/return 
procedures. This is indicated in ECHR case-law and the guidelines on forci-
ble returns issued by the Committee of  Ministers of  the Council of  Europe, 
which prohibit collective expulsion orders and stipulate the individual exa-
mination of  each case and the adoption of  individual decisions on return. It 
should also be borne in mind that in 2009, Spain ratified Additional Protocol 
4 of  the Rome Convention (1950) for the protection of  human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, which prohibits the collective expulsion of  foreign 
51 Directive 2008/115/EC of  the European Parliament and of  the Council of  16 December 
2008 on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying 
third-country nationals, better known as the Returns Directive, transposed into Spanish do-
mestic law by Organic Law 2/2009, of  11 December, on the amendment of  Organic Law 
4/2000, of  11 January, on the rights and freedoms of  foreigners in Spain and their social 
integration (BOE) No. 299, 12 December 2009). Chapter III (arts. 12, 13 and 14) provides 
for a procedure documented in writing, with the possibility of  appeal and with the assistance 
of  counsel and an interpreter.
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nationals. According to the interpretation made in ECHR case-law, this re-
presents a prohibition in the qualitative rather than quantitative sense of  the 
term, since its determining feature is not that it falls on a more or less nu-
merous group of  people, but that it “does not guarantee the possibility of  
making allegations or recording who the expelled person is or if  the person 
needs any special protection”52.
In fact, within the framework of  the Council of  Europe, 30 July 2015, 
the ECHR asked the Spanish Government for an explanation of  the sum-
mary returns carried out on 13 August 2014, following the actions brought 
by two Sub-Saharan Africans (from Mali and Ivory Coast) who had managed 
to climb over the border fence at Melilla53.
Lastly, in the aforementioned judgement on this issue of  3 October 2017, 
the ECHR ruled that Spain had violated article 4 of  Protocol 4, which prohi-
bits the collective expulsion of  foreign nationals, and article 13 of  the Rome 
Convention, which recognises the right to an effective remedy, made in rela-
tion to article 4 of  Protocol 454.
3. VALIDITY OF THE SPANISH-MOROCCAN AGREEMENT ON READMISSION OF 
FOREIGNERS WHO HAVE ENTERED IRREGULARLY
Having questioned the legality and expediency of  the new concept of  re-
jection at the border, in line with the argument that the unique characteristics 
of  Ceuta and Melilla are already contemplated in the Spanish law on aliens 
(articles 58.3.b) of  the LOEx and 23.1.b) of  the RLOEx), once the return 
of  immigrants has been decided by resolution of  the Government Delegate 
in Ceuta and Melilla, this would be implemented under the terms laid down 
in the 1992 Spanish-Moroccan agreement on readmission of  foreigners who 
have entered irregularly, the validity of  which has not yet been questioned55. 
52 See “Rechazos en frontera”: ¿Frontera sin derechos?, cit., p. 27.
53 <http://www.statewatch.org/news/2015/aug/echr-spain-hot-returns-decision-fr.pdf>. 
54 The ECHR thus recognised the collective nature of  the expulsion, highlighting that it 
was performed in the absence of  an administrative or judicial decision and without any 
procedure on the part of  the Spanish authorities to identify the plaintiffs.  In this ruling, 
the ECHR also established a connection between the collective expulsion of  the plaintiffs 
on the border of  Melilla and the fact that they were not allowed to present an appeal to the 
competent authority. 
55 Entry into force of  the Agreement between the Kingdom of  Spain and the Kingdom of  
Morocco concerning the movement of  personnel and the transit and readmission of  for-
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This agreement allows the border authorities in Ceuta and Melilla to respect 
human rights and ensure compliance with the legislation on asylum and sub-
sidiary protection.
Therefore, the return of  Sub-Saharan immigrants should be implemented 
in accordance with the provisions of  chapter I on “readmission of  foreign 
nationals”. The scope of  this agreement is limited to nationals of  third coun-
tries, who would be readmitted by the Moroccan border authorities at the 
formal request of  the Spanish State, when they have irregularly entered Spa-
nish territory from Morocco. This thus envisages the possibility of  readmis-
sion of  Sub-Saharan African immigrants found trapped between the fences, 
climbing a fence or located in their vicinity, in compliance with the provisions 
of  article 2. According to this provision, readmission shall be made if  it can 
be proven by any means that the foreign national whose readmission is sou-
ght has come from Moroccan territory. This is easy to prove in the case of  
those who have swum from Morocco to Ceuta or Melilla.
Once the return of  immigrants has been decided by resolution of  the 
Government Delegate in Ceuta or Melilla, in accordance with the Spanish 
legislation on immigrants (i.e. the provisions of  articles 58.3.b) of  the LOEx 
and 23.1.b) of  the RLOEx), Spain has ten days from the moment of  illegal 
entry into Spanish territory to lodge a request with the Moroccan authorities 
for their readmission to Morocco, if  their right to apply for asylum or subsi-
diary protection has been denied.
This readmission request should include all available information on the 
identity and personal documentation of  each immigrant and the conditions 
of  their irregular entry into Spanish territory, as well as any other information 
possessed about each individual. Then, if  the request is accepted, the Mo-
roccan border authorities must formalise this by issuing a certificate or other 
document indicating the identity and, where appropriate, the documents held 
by the foreign national. Article 3 of  the agreement thus ensures compliance 
with the Spanish legislation on international protection, as it does not provide 
for the readmission of  foreign nationals who have been authorised to remain 
in Spain after their illegal entry, nor of  those to whom Spain has accorded 
refugee status in accordance with the Geneva Convention of  1951: indeed, if  
eigners who have entered illegally, signed in Madrid on 13 February 1992, BOE No. 299, 13 
December 2012.
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such circumstances are revealed by investigations following their readmission 
to Morocco, they must be returned to Spain.
Lastly, according to article 5, Morocco shall ensure that returned foreign 
nationals are sent as soon as possible to their State of  origin or to the State 
where they began their journey, if  they do not have the right to remain on 
Moroccan territory.
Therefore, since the Spanish-Moroccan agreement on readmission of  fo-
reigners who have entered irregularly remains in force, why is it not applied, 
if  it is the procedure for executing the resolution of  the Government Dele-
gate in Ceuta and Melilla that authorises the return?
IV. FINAL ASSESSMENT
Late 2017 has witnessed a sharp increase in immigration by sea to Spain 
using the West Mediterranean route, consisting mainly of  Sub-Saharan Afri-
cans and Algerian and Moroccan migrants departing from some point on the 
Moroccan coast (between Al Hoceima and Nador) and bound for Almeria and 
Granada56. Nevertheless, despite strengthening the Ceuta and Melilla border 
fences in recent years, immigrants continue to enter these cities by land, either 
swimming or during mass jumps or assaults on the fences or border posts. 
This means that close cooperation with Morocco is vital for Spain in the fight 
against illegal immigration, and this has been achieved despite occasional cool-
ness in relations due to Morocco’s claim to Spanish territories in North Africa.
Since 2005-2006, Sub-Saharan immigration has been a delicate issue in 
Spain’s bilateral relations with countries such as Morocco, Mauritania or Sene-
gal (in these latter cases, to halt the arrival of  immigrant boats to the Canary 
Islands), and one which requires a much broader approach, both regionally 
(involving Europe and Africa) and in terms of  scope (not solely limited to 
security issues). In this strategy Spain has since 2006 developed the “Africa 
Plans”57.
56 Elpais.com (04.11.2017): “Los inmigrantes se lanzan al mar de Alborán”.
57 See AlAMinos, M. A., “La política exterior de España hacia África Subsahariana a través del 
análisis crítico de los Planes África”, UNISCI Discussion Papers, Nº. 27, 2011; Políticas de control 
migratorio y de cooperación al desarrollo entre España y África Occidental durante la ejecución del primer 
Plan África, Alboan-Entreculturas, Bilbao 2011.
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Consequently, following the migration events in Ceuta and Melilla in 
2005, Spain and Morocco took the initiative and the commitment to promote 
“triangular” cooperation between countries of  origin, transit and destination58, 
which also took into account the link between migration and development. As 
a result, a conference on migration and development was held in Rabat on 10 
and 11 July 2006, at which participants adopted a political Declaration and a 
Plan of  Action59.
This rendered it necessary to develop strategies for development coope-
ration in the States of  origin and formulate policies that would help regulate 
the arrival of  immigrants and their social and occupational integration60. The 
EU has adopted a new approach and perspective on these issues, as evidenced 
in the Commission’s Green Paper: “An EU approach to managing economic 
58 See joint Declaration, adopted following the meeting of  the Ministers of  Foreign Affairs 
and of  Cooperation, between the Kingdom of  Morocco and the Kingdom of  Spain, Ma-
drid-Rabat, 11 October 2005, No. 9682 Spanish Ministry of  Foreign Affairs and Coopera-
tion (MAEC). 
59 See press release No. 117 MAEC (10.07.2006) and sorrozA blAnco, A. “La Conferen-
cia Euroafricana de Migración y Desarrollo: más allá del “espíritu de Rabat””, Real Instituto 
Elcano de Estudios Internacionales y Estratégicos, ARI no. 93/2006, 28.08.2006 (in http://www.
realinstitutoelcano.org/analisis/imprimir/1028imp.asp), who indicates the six areas into 
which the Plan of  Action is divided: 1) Migration and development; 2) Legal migration; 3) 
Illegal immigration; 4) Police and judicial operational cooperation and assistance to victims; 
5) Funding; and 6) Institutional and monitoring framework. See also fAjArdo del cAstillo , 
T., “La Conferencia Ministerial Euro-Africana de Rabat sobre la inmigración y el desarrollo. 
Algunas reflexiones sobre la política de inmigración de España y de la UE”, RDCE, no. 25, 
2006, pp. 913-943, in particular, pp. 924-929.
60 Trujillo MArrero, A., “La atención en frontera a inmigrantes en situación irregular” in 
del VAlle GálVez, A. del and AcostA sánchez, M. A., Inmigración irregular y Derecho, Univer-
sidad de Cádiz, 2005, p. 67. 
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immigration”61, and in the “EU strategy for Africa: towards a Euro-African 
pact to accelerate Africa’s development”62.
Since 2006, Spain has implemented a policy whereby the provision of  aid 
is conditional on fighting illegal immigration. Thus, for example, Mauritania 
and Senegal have received between 15 and 25 million euros annually since 
2006. In total, Mauritania has received 108.45 million, of  which 88.6 have 
been destined for border control and 19.8 for development aid. In the case 
of  Senegal, Spanish aid (59.7 million euros in total) has been divided between 
border control (34.9) and development cooperation (24.8). This model has 
also been applied by the EU through the signing in 2016 of  the so-called 
Migration Compacts with Niger, Nigeria, Mali, Senegal and Ethiopia; however, 
diplomatic sources admit that in view of  the number of  immigrants crossing 
61 Document COM(2004) 811, Brussels, 11 January 2005, which provides additional meas-
ures for integration, repatriation and cooperation with third countries, including the follow-
ing (pp. 11-12): “To provide updated information on the conditions of  entry and residence 
in the EU, create training and recruitment centres in countries of  origin in relation to the 
qualifications required in the EU, as well as language and cultural training, create databases 
on the skills/occupation/sector (competence portfolio) of  potential migrants, facilitate the 
transfer of  migrants’ remittances and compensate third countries for the costs of  teaching 
the people who migrate to the EU”. 
62 Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the 
European Economic and Social Committee, document COM (2005) 489 final, 12 October 
2005. See “La Comisión Europea aprueba un `Plan Marshall´ para África” (http://www.
elmundo.es, 12.10.05). In the words of  Peral, this Plan would signify: “Cancelling the debt of  
African countries, removing tariffs and agricultural subsidies to allow free access of  African 
products to western markets, and quadrupling over the next ten years the 25,000 million 
dollars that western countries currently donate to Africa”. See L. perAl, “Vida, libertad y 
presión migratoria. Aproximación jurídica al problema de la devolución de personas en las 
fronteras de Ceuta y Melilla”, Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo 
Exterior (FRIDE), 14.11.2005, p. 7/9.
See also the Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European 
Parliament, document COM(2005) 621 final of  30 November 2005, on Priority actions for 
responding to the challenges of  migration: First follow-up to Hampton Court, which addresses those 
aspects of  migration related to security and development (see in particular the initiatives 
referred to in paragraph III on “Dialogue and cooperation with Africa and in particular 
Sub-Saharan countries of  origin”, pp. 6-8), which served as the basis for the conclusions of  
the Presidency of  the European Council in Brussels, 15 and 16 December 2005, appendix 
I  to which was entitled “Global Approach to Migration: Priority actions focusing on Africa 
and the Mediterranean”. 
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the Mediterranean, these agreements are not yielding the desired result except 
in the case of  Niger63.
Hence, following the La Valletta Summit held in November of  2015, a 
new partnership framework has been established with third countries within 
the context of  the European Agenda on Migration64. An EU Emergency Trust 
Fund for Africa was also created, as a policy instrument for local development 
aimed at fostering cooperation with third countries on migration issues65. Wi-
thin the framework of  the above-mentioned trust fund, the Spanish Agency 
for International Development Cooperation (Spanish initials: AECID) wor-
ked actively in 2016 with the Ministry of  the Interior, the Ministry of  Em-
ployment and Social Security, and African countries to promote cooperation 
projects that address immigration. Of  particular note in this regard, was the 
AECID’s approval of  a cooperation project with Morocco to support imple-
mentation of  its new immigration strategy, with a focus on respect for human 
rights, developed by the General Secretariat of  Immigration and Emigration66.
But the new assistance delivered to Morocco by the EU and Spain should 
be directed at reducing irregular arrivals from the Moroccan coast and lead to 
further engagement with Morocco and other relevant countries to increase 
63 Elpais.com (20.06.2017): “España ha gastado 168 millones en frenar la llegada de cayucos 
a Canarias”.
64 European Commission – Press release (Strasbourg, 7 June 2016): “La Comisión anuncia 
un Nuevo Marco de Asociación en Materia de Migración: una cooperación reforzada con 
terceros países para gestionar mejor la migración”, European Commission – Press release 
(Strasbourg, 13 June 2017): “Partnership Framework on Migration: Commission reports on 
results and lessons learnt one year on”; Doc. COM (2017) 471 final, Brussels, 06.09.2017, 
Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council and the 
Council, Fifth Progress Report on the Partnership Framework with third countries under the 
European Agenda on Migration.
65 As well as direct support to Morocco, the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africais working 
to develop cooperation along the whole of  the route to the Western Mediterranean. A new 
cross-border cooperation programme worth EUR 8.6 million is strengthening coordinated 
migration governance between Morocco, Senegal, Mali and Côte d’Ivoire, supporting in-
tensified regional policy dialogues on migration. A specific budget support programme for 
Mauritania was approved at the end of  2018 to support the national development strategy, 
with a particular focus on migrants’ protection and maritime security. Doc. COM (2019) 126 
final, cit., p. 5.
66 Informe Anual de Seguridad Nacional 2016, Consejo de Seguridad Nacional, Part 8 “Ordena-
ción de flujos migratorios”, pp. 117-124 at p. 121.
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the effective readmission of  irregular migrants as part of  a comprehensive 
approach67.
To conclude, we must emphasize that Spain must respect immigrants’ hu-
man rights in expulsion/return procedures, in accordance with the Schengen 
Borders Code, the directive on return and the EUCFR. Therefore, the special 
regime of  Ceuta and Melilla or the reinforcement of  border control to stop 
the migratory flows from Morocco to Spain can not be alleged to the detri-
ment of  the procedural safeguards and the immigrants’ human rights, recog-
nized in Human Rights Treaties ratified by Spain.
But to curb migration flows, the reinforcement of  border control must be 
accompanied by common policies in the European countries of  destination 
and increased investment in the countries of  origin and transit. The Spain’s 
bilateral cooperation with Morocco, Mauritania, Senegal and other African 
countries could be in this sense an interesting experience to be considered.
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